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Giving credit where it’s due – but no more: 
an ethical analysis of trade credit 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In spite of its commercial importance and signs of some concern by some 
commentators, trade credit has not been subjected to serious ethical analysis.  This is 
especially important in the current financial crisis, given that credit from banks is in 
short supply, leading to increasing pressure on trade credit.  In addition to identifying 
trade credit as a topic of ethical significance, this paper develops an analysis of the 
ethics of trade credit grounded in an understanding of its purpose.  Making a 
distinction between “operating” trade credit and “financial” trade credit, it provides an 
account of the maximum period for which it is appropriate for one company to delay 
payment to another from which it has purchased goods or services.  This has 
implications not only for companies that take credit but also for external 
commentators who seek to rate companies according to their speed of payment.  The 
responsibility of suppliers not to extend excessive credit, and thus act as a quasi-bank, 
also follows from the analysis developed. 
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Giving credit where it’s due – but no more: 
an ethical analysis of trade credit 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of its importance, finance rarely appears in writing on business ethics 
(Boatright, 1999; 2008), and with the intellectual “capture” of finance by financial 
economics (Whitely, 1986), ethics is also given little consideration within finance 
literature (Prindl & Prodhan, 1994).  Thus few mainstream financial topics have been 
analyzed adequately from an ethical perspective.  Some have barely been addressed at 
all; one such topic is trade credit.   
 
In addition to the direct effects of recession upon their operating cash flow, firms are 
usually affected by difficulties in securing funds from credit institutions during times 
of economic crisis (see, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache & Gupta, 2006; 
Eichengreen & Rose, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999).  What is unusual is that the 
current general economic problems are consequences rather than causes of the credit 
crisis – a crisis which has called into question the integrity of the banking system (cf. 
Cowton, 2002).  The resulting financial stresses impact upon firms’ use of trade 
credit, thus exacerbating and highlighting issues that are always present but generally 
neglected, at least in the academic literature.  This paper identifies and explores trade 
credit granted by a supplier firm to its business customers as a topic for ethical 
consideration.   
 
Trade credit is the provision by one firm to another of goods or services in the 
expectation that payment will be received at a later date.  The delay between the 
provision of goods or services on the one hand and payment on the other amounts to 
the extension of a loan by the supplying company to it customer, and like any loan, it 
entails the risk of delayed payment or even default.  As will be outlined and discussed 
below, although it is not always recognized in such terms, the payment behaviour of 
the purchaser towards the supplier possesses ethical dimensions; so too, it will be 
argued, does the behaviour of the supplier. 
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The aim of the paper is to establish the case for exploring trade credit in ethical terms 
and to develop a framework for thinking about the ethics of trade credit practice by 
tightly coupling the granting of trade credit to the underlying provision of goods and 
service used by a purchasing firm in pursuit of its business.  The paper is structured as 
follows.  The first main section provides an overview of how trade credit has been 
discussed, including some recent concerns that have become apparent on the part of 
some policy makers and other commentators.  The second section then sets out the 
basic argument of the paper regarding an ethically sound approach to trade credit, 
focusing on the simple situation of two firms transacting with one another, where the 
second firm (the business customer, a retailer) makes its sales on a cash basis.  The 
third section discusses various implications and possible limitations of the analysis.  
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the principal elements of the argument and 
highlights the contributions of the paper. 
 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF TRADE CREDIT 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a non-technical overview of the principal 
strands in the discussion of trade credit.   
 
Trade credit is a major source of financing for the corporate sector and plays an 
important role in the external financing of companies (Elliehausen & Wolken, 1993; 
Ng, Smith & Smith, 1999; Wilson & Summers, 2002; Stern & Chew, 2003; Van 
Horne & Wachowicz, 2001).  The use of trade credit by non-financial firms is not 
new; trade credit has long been one of the most important forms of financing in the 
US economy (Seiden, 1964).  However, in the US, the amount of outstanding 
accounts payable (that is, money owed by companies to other companies) increased 
by four times during the period 1990 to 2000, reaching a total of $3,758 billion (109) 
(Statistical Abstract of the United States 2003, http://www.census.gov/).  In 2003, 
trade credit was used by 60% of small US businesses, 
(http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html), rising to more than 85 percent of 
the largest firms (Federal Reserve Bulletin, “Financial Services used by Small 
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Businesses: Evidence from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances,”1 
A182/A183, available on http://www.federalreserve.gov). 
 
The situation is similar in other developed economies, such as the UK.  Kohler, 
Britton & Yates (2000) estimate that 55% of the total short-term credit received by 
UK firms during the period 1983 to 1995 took the form of trade credit, and it is 
generally accepted that more than “80% of daily ‘business to business’ transactions 
are on credit terms” (Wilson & Summers, 2002: 319).  Trade credit is used by both 
small and large companies.  In 2007, trade creditors owed small firms in the UK a 
total of £48,666 million (FAME Database2).  The total amount of trade creditors for a 
sample of 200 FTSE firms (representing approximately 85% of UK stock market 
capitalization) is £434,447 million.  
 
So, trade credit is widely and heavily used by companies to support their business 
activity (Brennan, Maksimovic, & Zechner, 1988; Meltzer, 1960; Petersen & Rajan, 
1997).  However, it puts a strain on suppliers’ resources because goods or services are 
produced and provided without, at least for a time, receiving payment. 
 
There are many economic studies that explain and test, theoretically and empirically, 
why trade credit is used.  These studies focus on how it can help a company to 
increase sales  (Brennan, Maksimovic, & Zechner, 1988; Emery, 1987; Meltzer, 1960; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Schwartz, 1974), enabling it to gear up production in 
advance of the receipt of monies owed, and hence supporting growth (Cuñat, 2007; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1997).  Studies also examine the use of trade credit as a substitute 
for bank credit, particularly when the latter is difficult to come by (Gertler & 
Gilchrist, 1994; Jaffee, 1969; Nilsen, 2002; Schwartz, 1974).  As in previous 
downturns (Smith, 1987; Walker, 1991), the current economic recession engendered 
by the banking crisis will be putting pressure on trade credit, tempting companies to 
take longer to pay their suppliers.   
                                               
1
 The SSBF provides the most comprehensive information on the patterns of credit use by 
small businesses and their providers for 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003. The 2003 survey is 
the last to be conducted. 
2
 FAME, Bureau van Dijk database contains information for companies in the UK and Ireland. 
FAME contains information on 3.4 million companies, 2.8 million of which are in a detailed 
format (http://www.bvdep.com). 
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This practice of delaying payment accords with conventional commercial wisdom and 
is reflected in some of the ways in which trade credit is described in finance and 
corporate management textbooks.  Trade credit has been variously described as a 
“spontaneous source” (Block & Hirt, 1994; Gitman, 1988), “an easy financing form” 
(Stern & Chew, 2003; Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2001), “informal” (Arnold, 2005; 
Gitman, 1988; Weston & Copeland, 1992), “accepted practice” (Pike & Neal, 1993), 
and “liberal extension of money” (Van Horne & Wachowicz, 2001).  It is generally 
assumed that the norm is for trade debtors to take a long time to pay, particularly in 
industries such as manufacturing (Atrill & McLaney, 2002).  Some financial texts 
suggest that purchasing companies stretch the credit period offered by suppliers (cf. 
McMenamin, 1999).  Gitman, Forrester & Forrester (1976: 169-170) confirm that a 
basic cash management strategy normally applied is to pay accounts payable as late as 
possible without damaging the firm’s credit rating and supplier relationship.   
 
Such practices raise ethical issues.  Delay (or, even worse, default, which tends to 
increase with delay) in paying by customers, especially major ones, can have severe, 
if not fatal, financial consequences for suppliers, which in turn has repercussions for 
their own suppliers and other stakeholders, such as employees.  Concern has been 
voiced by some commentators, particularly in relation to small firms (Barrow, 2006; 
Dalton, 2007; Hodgetts & Kuratko, 2001; Sihler, 2004).  
Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to the problems caused by 
late payment especially with large corporate customers who can use their 
market position to dictate their own payment terms. Many large firms use 
their small-firm suppliers as a bank – taking, what is in effect, an interest-
free overdraft. (Ryan, 2008: 373) 
 
In the UK at least, such worries have led to several policy initiatives during the past 
decade or so.  For example, since 19973 it has been mandatory for large firms in the 
UK to disclose in their Annual Reports (Directors’ Report) the number of days taken 
to pay their suppliers.  This is calculated by dividing the trade creditors (accounts 
payable) total at the end of the financial year by the aggregate amount invoiced by 
suppliers during the year.  This should give a more reliable estimate than the ratio 
                                               
3
 SI (Statutory Instrument) 1996/189. 
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traditionally calculated by financial analysts, where cost of sales or even total revenue 
are used as proxies for the amount invoiced by suppliers.  Using this information, the 
Payment League Table has been developed as a “helpful tool” for suppliers, showing 
which companies are the best payers.4   
 
Further regulations were introduced in 1998.  The Late Payment of Commercial Debts 
(Interest) Act sought to encourage purchasers to pay on time by suppliers the right to 
claim interest on overdue accounts.  Previously, businesses were only able to claim 
interest on late paid debts if it was included in the contract, or if they pursued the debt 
through the courts and the courts awarded interest.  Similarly, in 2000, Directive 
2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Late 
Payment in Commercial Transactions was published in the Official Journal L 200.  
This Directive is aimed at dealing with the problem of late payment, with a focus on 
helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  If the customer does not pay on the 
day fixed in the contract (or, if the date or period for payment is not fixed in the 
contract, within 30 days of receipt of the invoice or receipt of the goods or services), 
the debtor is obliged to pay “penalty interest”.  Claiming and receiving such interest in 
practice tends to be challenging, but these legislative initiatives are symptomatic of a 
concern about trade credit payment practices. 
 
Large UK companies are also required to disclose their policies on the payment of 
trade creditors and to state whether they follow any code or standard on payment 
practice, and if so, provide the name of the code or standard and information about 
how to obtain copies of the code.  So far, there have been three such codes widely 
available in the UK.  The first was “The Prompt Payers’ Code”.  Developed by the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), it started operating in November 1991.  
During its period of operation between 1991 and 1997, the Code was signed 
voluntarily by 1000 firms, most of them limited companies.  In 1997, the CBI Code 
was superseded by the “The Better Payment Practice Code”, developed by the 
government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  Again, this code is voluntary 
and more than 1000 firms signed it between 1997 and 2008.  More recently, in 
                                               
4
 This table, available at http://www.paymentleague.com, is a joint venture between the 
Institute of Credit Management (ICM), the Credit Management Research Centre (CMRC) 
and Credit Scorer Ltd. 
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December 2008, the third UK payment code appeared, supported by the Institute of 
Credit Management (ICM) on behalf of the government’s Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) – the now defunct successor to the DTI.  
The “Prompt Payment Code” is another voluntary payment code, focused in a direct 
way, not only on information and paying bills, but also on helping to increase the 
speed of payments to smaller companies.   
 
These various initiatives briefly described above are designed to encourage “better” 
behaviour by companies in dealing with their suppliers.  The purpose of reviewing 
them is not to provide a comprehensive account of their content and effectiveness, but 
rather to establish that there are signs of ‘worrying’ about trade credit in ways that 
have ethical overtones or would benefit from ethical analysis. 
 
In conclusion, this section has sought to accomplish three things: first, to show that 
trade credit is an important commercial practice; second, to show that conventional 
wisdom regarding the taking of trade credit – as reflected in financial management 
texts, for example – is, at best, amoral; and third, to note that there have been signs of 
concern on the part of some policy makers and other commentators.  These three 
factors imply that trade credit is prima facie a practice worthy of serious ethical 
analysis.  The next section attempts to develop such an analysis. 
 
 
THE ETHICS OF TRADE CREDIT BETWEEN BUSINESSES 
 
It might be contended that the granting of trade credit and the payment of trade debts 
is simply a matter between the two contracting parties; it is open to the supplier and 
purchaser to agree mutually acceptable terms of trade and equally open to them to 
seek legal redress in civil, rather than criminal, law if the other party does not perform 
according to the contract.5  However, it will be argued below that there are two sorts 
of respects in which ethical, if not legal, considerations should be brought to bear: 
                                               
5
 By way of contrast, consumer credit which, in its various forms, involves a private individual 
acquiring, or obtaining the use of with a commitment or option to acquire, a consumer good 
is subject to significant regulation.  It is an area fraught with risks for the unwary private 
individual, and governments in many nations have constructed regulatory mechanisms to 
protect them.   
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first, because of the nature of the relationship between the two parties; and second, 
because of the possible impact of this relationship on third parties. 
 
The policy initiatives described in the previous section suggest a concern over one 
company taking too long (however determined) to pay another company.  They 
further suggest a useful distinction.  First, a company might take longer than 
contracted to pay its supplier.  Of course, this entails a legal breach of contract.  
However, in most cases it is not worthwhile going to law because of the expense of 
doing so and, where further custom is hoped for (the norm in business to business 
relationships), because of the risk of damaging future commercial activities between 
the two companies.  Nevertheless, whether or not legal redress is considered 
appropriate, late payment does seem to imply, at least, a moral philosophical opening 
in terms of promise keeping, with the various elements that would normally go into 
such a discussion.  Thus prompt payment can be seen as a case of keeping a promise, 
perhaps meritoriously, while late payment can be seen as a case of breaking a promise 
– perhaps, in certain circumstances, with some justification or at least defense. 
 
However, there is a further dimension to this.  Not all promises are good promises.  A 
“bad” promise might be kept, but that is not necessarily a good thing, in particular 
where there is an asymmetry of power involved in the setting up of the bargain.  
Although there might be a presumption that such circumstances are unlikely in 
business-to-business relationships, the policy initiatives referred to in the previous 
section were first enacted in the context of small companies’ relationships with larger 
companies, and commentary from a small business perspective has referred to large 
companies taking too much credit.  This might be through demanding unreasonable 
terms of trade, such as an unusually long period of credit.  Thus a company might pay 
promptly, but “too slow”.  One way of opening up this issue would be to build on the 
tradition of a just or fair price, where the degree of trade credit taken becomes part of 
the consideration of what it means for a purchaser to act fairly towards a supplier.  
This could be done by comparing the purchasing company’s behavior towards one 
supplier with its behavior towards other suppliers; or, more widely, to compare its 
payment behavior with that of other firms – the kind of comparison that the figures 
disclosed in UK directors’ reports, or the ratios traditionally calculated from financial 
accounts, permit.  However, while the latter appears to have some initial attractions, 
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including practicability, the analysis developed below suggests that it has significant 
shortcomings.  Rather than simply comparing financial statistics, the analysis takes a 
step back to ask more fundamental questions about trade credit and to build an 
argument that attempts to specify what the period of trade credit should be. 
 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, trade credit involves one company supplying 
goods or services to another without receiving any money in return at the time of 
delivery.  This looks like a loan; the supplier has done work but the money it is owed 
at that date will – hopefully – arrive later, while the business customer is enjoying the 
benefit of goods and services without having, at this point, paid for them.  Financially, 
the purchaser is in the same situation as if it had borrowed money from the bank and 
bought the goods or services using the funds obtained.  Indeed, the interchangeability 
of trade credit and bank finance, as covered in texts on financial management, was 
referred to earlier in this paper.  In effect, the supplier is acting as a banker to the 
purchaser.  Yet – as the present financial crisis has reminded us – banks are very 
special institutions, with peculiar characteristics when compared with mainstream 
businesses.  Going back to at least the nineteenth century, this has led to their being 
subject to special forms of control.  Insofar as supplying firms act as banks – 
providing, as noted earlier, vast amounts of credit to other businesses – they are not 
subject to such controls.   
 
One reason for this is that suppliers can be seen as taking part in a joint enterprise 
with their customers.  Suppose the purchasing company is a shopping mall retailer 
that sells to the final consumer on a cash basis.  The supplier provides goods to the 
retailer, whose role is to get the supplier’s product to market.  Once the final 
consumer pays, then a sum of money becomes available to pay the supplier, with the 
balance remaining with the retailer to pay its other costs and generate a return.  Not 
only can this be seen as a joint enterprise, but imagine if the supplier were vertically 
integrated to the final consumer market – it would still have to wait until the final 
consumer paid before it had the money earned by its efforts.  Business is normally 
like this; costs are incurred in the expectation of subsequent revenue. 
 
This scenario demonstrates that it is reasonable for the business customer to take trade 
credit while both it and its supplier wait for a sale to be made in the final product 
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market (store).  However, once that sale is made, the supplier should be paid 
immediately; there is no longer any justification for taking the trade credit, and to hold 
the money back is to forcibly borrow the money due to the supplier.  This analysis 
thus argues that the trade credit period can justifiably be as long as, and no longer 
than, the period taken to receive the money from the final consumer.  At that point, 
the rewards of the joint enterprise should be shared between the collaborators – in this 
simple case, the retailer and the supplier. 
 
On the one hand, this analysis places an ethical duty on the buying company not to 
take trade credit beyond a certain period of time.  This duty could, in principle, be 
“called in” by the supplier.  Certainly, the implication of the argument is that it is 
unfair for the buyer to take credit beyond the point where it receives payment.  On the 
other hand, in tying the appropriate trade credit period to the underlying business 
process, the analysis suggests that there may be ethical implications for the supplier 
too.  The point is this: if a supplier chooses or agrees to grant credit beyond the period 
when the final customer pays, then the supplier is going beyond the parameters of the 
joint enterprise and for the “excess” period of credit it is, in effect, acting as a banker 
rather than a commercial partner.  Thus the position moves from one of real or 
“operating” trade credit to one of “financial” trade credit.6  Given, first, that banks are 
subject to special regulations, and, second, that the supplier’s stakeholders (such as 
employees, its own suppliers and local community) can be adversely affected if it has 
a major customer default on its payments, then it can be argued that suppliers are 
under an obligation not to grant trade credit inappropriately.  That would include not 
granting credit recklessly, but it would also include, per the analysis here, not granting 
– or at least seeking not to grant – credit beyond periods justified by the joint 
enterprise implied by getting its products to final market.  This is the second respect in 
which a promise might not be a good one; though made willingly between two parties, 
it leads to an increased risk of undesirable consequences for third parties. 
 
                                               
6
 This distinction, of our own devising, mirrors the conventional distinction in finance between 
operating leases and finance leases. 
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Thus we have argued that the granting and taking of trade credit is, up to a certain 
point, an acceptable, or indeed good,7 practice, but that after that point it is ethically 
dubious.  Rather than attempting to justify some arbitrary, perhaps conventional, 
number of days’ credit, the argument has sought to ground the appropriate credit 
period in the underlying economic processes which give rise to it.  In the following 
section, we identify and comment on some possible objections to our analysis and 
then go on to suggest what the contributions of the paper are. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In the previous section, the argument sought to ground an ethical understanding of 
trade credit in the “real” (as opposed to purely financial) underlying business 
processes.  Yet it might be objected that the approach is not “realistic”.  Many 
practical details have not been mentioned or fully dealt with.  Given that this paper is 
a first to attempt to treat the ethics of trade credit in a systematic manner, this is not 
necessarily a major problem.  Our objective has been to lay the groundwork for future 
discussion.  Nevertheless, we will mention a few practical issues and sketch some 
outline responses. 
 
First, the example discussed in the previous section concerns only a dyadic 
relationship, whereas in practice a supply chain can have many links.  However, the 
principle argued for above remains the same.  Once money enters the supply chain, it 
should pass quickly along it.  When company x receives payment in the final product 
market, it should pass an appropriate sum of money to its supplier, company x-1; 
which, as a purchasing company, should pass a share of that money on to its supplier, 
company x-2; and so on.  Goods might move slowly along the supply chain, but the 
money, once it has entered the supply chain, should flush back virtually 
instantaneously, without hindrance. 
 
Second, the analysis seems to entail two particular complications when compared 
with current standard practice.  It seems to suggest that prior to setting the terms of 
                                               
7
 Other things being equal, the encouragement of economic activity is taken to be a good 
thing. 
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trade regarding settlement of an invoice, the parties to the deal will need to forecast 
when cash will be received, and this is usually uncertain – though the degree of 
uncertainty will vary.  In an ideal world, there would be no need to set a period of 
credit since, as explained, cash would simply be received and a share passed on 
immediately, through the supply chain.  However, being more pragmatic, what 
follows from our analysis is that the credit period should be set with some regard to 
the underlying business processes, for example with only a short period of credit 
granted when the transaction is temporally close to the final receipt of cash.  
Similarly, taking the case of a retailer again, different products will sell more quickly.  
Instead of the ideal of passing on money as soon as it is received, a retailer could 
undertake to pay based on its average inventory turnover period (assuming cash 
sales); a longer period would not be justified.  Or it could take a more sophisticated 
approach and base its payment policies on the average inventory turnover for 
particular classes of goods; this would more closely approximate the ideal.   
 
Third, the examples so far have tended to assume the provision of goods for onward 
sale.  However, some goods (e.g. stationery supplies) to not enter the production or 
distribution process but rather support them.  In these cases they are not incorporated 
directly in sales in the final product market.  Similarly, many services have a 
somewhat ambivalent relationship to identifiable activities further along the supply 
chain.  However, it should still, in principle, be possible to analyze the way in which a 
firm uses bought-in services and other goods to support its activities, whether the 
purchasing firm is a manufacturer, retailer or – itself – a service provider.  From an 
understanding of the firm’s use of services in its own business, it should be possible to 
derive suitable measures or proxies to indicate whether it is using trade credit to 
facilitate its own sales (legitimate) or as a more general source of finance 
(illegitimate).   
 
Finally, a more general possible objection to the “realism” of the analysis is that the it 
is not “realistic” in what it expects companies to do; they will not adopt the ideal 
practice advocated or even change in the direction implied by it.  This is a familiar 
charge against normative business ethics, or indeed against any ethical analysis that 
finds practice wanting in some respect.  In the context of business ethics, this often 
entails explicit or implicit assumptions about the way competitive markets function.  
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In the case of trade credit, the argument that the “realities” of competition leave no 
room for manoeuvre might go something like this: if one supplying company does not 
allow as long a credit period as its competitors (either in its explicit terms of business 
or through enforcement that other firms do not attempt to do), ceteris paribus it will 
lose out and be forced to come into line.  Thus there would appear to be the possibility 
of a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of trade credit granted.  One response to this is to 
affirm that managers of a company have some room for agency.  Lucas (1998: 59) 
comments: “Economic determinism is false.  The iron laws of supply and demand are 
not made of iron, and indicate tendencies only.”  How much room for choice is left is 
an empirical question, but it is not a given that at least some companies, some of the 
time, cannot follow our suggestions.  Furthermore, even if companies are propelled by 
market forces into providing financial, in addition to operating, trade credit, our 
analysis identifies the shortcomings of such practice and invites regulatory or other 
system-level reform to address the issue. 
 
However, there are implications of our paper beyond the behavior of the companies 
concerned.  One is that companies’ payment practice should not be judged solely 
according to the number of days’ credit they take on average.  The analysis of this 
paper demonstrates that a commonsense focus on days’ credit, which is how 
published “league tables” of slow (and fast) payers are constructed, is misleading.  It 
may not be more praiseworthy (and probably is not) for a supermarket to pay 
suppliers in 25 days than for a manufacturing company to pay in 50 days.  Compilers 
of such tables might complain that they are the best that can be produced, given the 
data available, but if the best ranking that can be produced is misleading, it is better 
not to produce it at all.  Moreover, following from the argument of this paper, various 
improvements might be considered.  For example, notwithstanding the problems 
briefly alluded to earlier, separate tables might be compiled for different types of 
companies, with the grouping designed to reflect different underlying characteristics 
regarding the movement of goods through the supply chain towards final product 
markets.   
 
Finally, although this paper is normative, in the sense of setting out an ideal, it does 
not base its argument on abstract ethical principles but rather on an account of what 
trade credit is for.  This account could itself be debated in more abstract moral 
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philosophical terms, but it is contended that the account is both reasonable and 
plausible – trade credit enables companies to co-operate in a joint productive 
enterprise and hence fulfil their functions better than if it did not exist.  
Fundamentally, we argue that a company should pay over the money involved when 
the purpose for which it was “borrowed” has been accomplished, at least where the 
source of the funding is not a bank; this seems to us a reasonable prima facie 
obligation, but not one that is voiced or followed in relation to trade credit. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Trade credit is an important commercial practice, the significance of which has been 
highlighted by the credit crisis.  This paper is, we believe, the first in the business 
ethics literature to identify and explore it as a topic worthy of ethical consideration – a 
perspective that is conspicuously missing from the finance literature.  We have 
outlined some of the concerns that have been voiced in business and public policy 
circles regarding trade credit practices, but rather than simply taking those at face 
value, we have sought to develop a framework that provides a firmer foundation for 
thinking about the ethics of trade credit.  Our analysis has highlighted two particular 
shortcomings of an exclusive focus on speed of payment when evaluating the 
behaviour of business customers in paying for their supplies.  First, it is important to 
distinguish between speed of payment and promptness (which is related to promise 
keeping).  Second, and possibly more important, without being related back to the 
underlying economic productive processes involved, speed (slowness) of payment, as 
measured by number of days’ credit taken, is a misleading indicator of the 
commendableness of a firm’s behavior.  In particular, on its own it gives no indication 
of whether a firm is holding onto money that it has received from its own customers, a 
proportion of which is due to the supplier with which it has been engaged in a joint 
enterprise or partnership to facilitate those sales.  The other novel aspect of our 
analysis is to go beyond a focus on the buying firm to introduce into the picture the 
responsibilities of the firm supplying the goods or services and credit.  These are not 
so much the conventional responsibilities of a bank not to lend irresponsibly – though 
reckless granting of trade credit is not recommended.  Rather, we have argued that the 
responsibility of the supplying firm is not to act as a bank at all – which is what 
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effectively happens when a purchasing firm takes credit for longer than what we have 
argued is the legitimate period.  To repeat our distinction, it is legitimate to provide 
“operating” trade credit but not “financial” trade credit.  While the policy implications 
of this might not all be practicable given well-established commercial practices and 
the dominant perspective in financial circles, we would claim that this is an important 
insight to bear in mind when the ethics of trade credit is being considered in future. 
 
Finally, although we have positioned this paper as a novel contribution to finance 
ethics, it has relevance to other aspects of business ethics too.  In particular, trade 
credit should also be factored into ethical analyses of, and debates about, supply chain 
ethics.   
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